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Abstract - SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition) networks control much of the industrialised
nations production and supply complexes. Various
government reports and investigations have highlighted the
vulnerability of these systems. Many of these systems are on
private networks which are increasingly being connected to
systems that are accessible from other networks such as the
Internet.
SCADA systems have unique security and operational
requirements. However, many of the most basic security
measures are missing in these networks. This examines
some of these issues and proposes some technologies that
could help secure these networks from attack.
Keywords: SCADA, infrastructure, countermeasures, open
source, IDS, firewall, honeypots
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Introduction

Critical infrastructure is largely controlled by the use of
automated control systems and in particular supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA
systems are being identified in various Government reports
and the media as systems that are increasingly coming
under attack [1-3]. The reports from various agencies rate
SCADA systems as highly vulnerable to attack or
compromise that would result in catastrophic failure of
these systems.
Many of these systems are used to run the modern industrial
complexes that supply modern Western nations with many
of the services and goods that they take for granted. These
systems are to be found in but not limited to: petroleum
complexes, power generation grids, water supply networks,
sewerage networks and most other complex systems that
require constant computer-based monitoring or control.
Failure or even disruption to these systems could have
catastrophic consequences resulting in supply chain
collapse, with resultant economic impacts and even loss of
life directly or indirectly. As a recent example, disruption of
gas services as a result of an industrial mishap in Western
Australia alone in 2008 almost saw that States economy
grind to a halt [4]. The loss of capacity at ~ 40% was
sufficient to have considerable downstream effects that for
instance caused laundry for hospitals to be shipped in from
other Australian states until increased supplies of gas could
be obtained. A cyber based attack that could disrupt supply
in the same manner could have similar effects.

SCADA/control devices and resultant systems are built to
run, monitor or control a particular process, typically as a
part of combined automated process that results in a
product. Many of these devices and systems in which they
operate are intended to run for the life of the project, life of
an ore body in a mine, or product cycle which can be
decades not weeks. As a result, SCADA systems have a
larger than expected level of legacy hardware and software
installed, the old engineering adage if it is not broken do not
fix it, was and remains a meme in many of these systems.
This modus operandi was a perfectly acceptable operational
paradigm in which to operate when many of these
companies/entities did not connect to any network except
their own, and the production or engineering network was
never connected to the corporate network that connected to
the Internet. This status quo has now changed for a number
of reasons, namely, the increasing ubiquity of the Internet
and its associated technologies and protocols and
interconnection with business processes. The drivers are not
always technological: smaller companies merge and
combine to become bigger entities, particularly as the
pressure of globalisation and economic rationalisation
increase. This trend leads toward network infrastructures
that are often comprised of different and disjointed legacy
network systems and infrastructures. Further adding to the
entropy with respect to the security and technical stability,
is the attachment to the corporate network and increasing
use of Internet technologies such as http to reach into these
SCADA and control networks. In addition, it is not
uncommon to have a third party entity in charge of the
SCADA network and systems, and possibly even an
additional third party IT outsourcing company in charge of
corporate networks.
Many of the older SCADA and control systems were
proprietary systems with protected protocols and processes.
As a result, these systems had a reasonably high level of
security through obscurity and limited knowledge of their
design and operation. When these SCADA and control
systems are upgraded, they are being moved to open
platform systems that utilise open network protocols such
as Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) or ModBUS,
and increasingly, TCP/IP based control systems.
Atypically, older systems infrastructures were controlled
via tied lines or privately controlled proprietary wired or
proprietary wireless networks. New generation SCADA and
control systems also use modern open standard
communications networks to provide access to the SCADA
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systems for control and command. These newer networks
even if totally private will almost atypically run the TCP/IP
range of protocols and supporting services for backbone
and control. Many providers are as previously mentioned
also replacing dedicated hard physical links to
control/command interfaces with links that may actually
travel on or rely upon open public networks such as the
Internet for data transport, due to either telecommunications
provider enforced changes, or due to financial pressure. Of
greater risk is that some of these systems utilise open
protocol wireless systems such as 2.4 GHz WiFi for these
command and control functionalities.
This paper will examine the threats to, and countermeasures
for SCADA systems as a result of the decreasing use of
proprietary protocols and equipment, and their move to
open protocol based systems and the use of the Internet as a
backbone. It should be noted that the hacker community is
increasingly aware of SCADA networking issues, with
serious exploits now being available in the Metasploit
framework for use by anyone who can use a mouse and
connect to the Internet.

2

SCADA – Slowly Circling A
Disaster Area

Unlike conventional Ethernet networks that run business
enterprises, SCADA and control networks typically need to
have consistent connection to devices that control industrial
processes. SCADA and control systems work by receiving
data from instruments or data points and also sending
commands or instructions to devices. These instructions or
data could be to check flow rates of toxic chemicals, or
open valves or start pumps to avert overflow of a fluid
storage facility. The system is set to poll or respond over a
given interval of time back to a controller or master. A
break in this polling as a result of a simple disruption of
these monitored processes can in turn cause these systems
to go into failsafe modes or implement shutdown
procedures or worse fail. These procedures are designed to
provide maximum safety for the particular process being
run, and in some cases these shutdowns or failsafe
procedures are mandated by regulation and law. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that disruption or denial of
service on a SCADA network could have catastrophic
consequences and is a highly undesirable event in these
systems.
SCADA and control systems are one set of systems where it
could be argued the use of open source or protocols
significantly impacts the security of these systems, and a
wide range of interconnected systems and critical
infrastructures. There is little doubt there is significant
value in secret knowledge or compartmentalisation of
knowledge for critical systems otherwise we would all have
access to nuclear missile launch codes.

As mentioned previously SCADA and control systems are
moving to open source/open community protocols such as
DNP3, and away from other proprietary systems protocols.
The logic behind having a common protocol and platform
across these systems so that each platform or vendor
devices can interact at a network or system level would be
one that seems complete and one that makes good
economic rational sense i.e. economies of scale, one
protocol, one training provider etc. It could also be argued
that it makes good technical sense as well to have a single
unified environment with common hardware and software
interacting. That is however, where any benefit stops,
particularly from a security perspective. The use of like
equipment can see an entire facility be vulnerable as part of
a larger exposure in the equipments core. Cisco is without
question the market leader in provision of network
hardware and software, yet even it has system wide
vulnerability that allowed complete compromise of a
network that was using its equipment. Furthermore the use
of a single platform in a network environment particularly
for egress and ingress of network packets goes against a
basic tenet of security, which is defence in depth.
Common protocols have been proven to be problematic in
networks, particularly if the flaw is patent and inherent in
the design. Even closed or supposedly private networks that
use wireless infrastructure are increasingly exposed as open
to attack [5]. If we take WiFi or 802.11 equipment as a
recent well known example, if the wireless equipment
meets the IEEE standard for 802.11 it is regardless of
manufacturer susceptible to a wide range of protocol based
attacks [6, 7]. These protocol based attacks are
devastatingly effective and unstoppable without further
countermeasures or extension of the 802.11 protocol. What
could occur if DNP3 or ModBUS or a similar SCADA
specific protocol was found to have the same level of
exploit?
Wireless based networks use a wide range of protocols and
rates of transmission and some even use half duplex
transmission to overcome low speed issues, but nonetheless
the irrefutable fact is that they are transmitting across a
commonly accessible media i.e. the atmosphere. This
accessibility enables the transmissions susceptible to denial
of service at a physical layer with wireless jamming devices
[8]. The bad news is that this attack at the physical layer is
almost impossible to defend against and can be hard to
trace. These physical attacks are in addition to known
exploits against particular wireless protocols which are
numerous and well documented [6, 7, 9]. Even if the
wireless communications use encryption or VPN
technologies to protect transmission, there are numerous
tools that can break, intercept or even inject into this type of
network countermeasures [10] and the aforementioned
physical attacks bypass these anyway. These vulnerabilities
in wireless and associated transmission protocols are also
not limited to WiFi or the 2.4 GHz spectrum simply
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because they are radio based: they can also apply to other
wireless frequencies and transmission protocols.
The use of open source protocols is also problematic as
many modern SCADA systems have http enabled
management consoles and use either direct wired or
wireless connectivity to achieve connection and you will
have significant security problems already associated with
normal network transport.
SQL and database technologies are an invaluable tool for
storing and retrieving data from appliances, and they are
also widely used in configuration management for SCADA
and control systems. They provide the ability to relay or
receive commands, gather outputs or readings from various
apparatus and store them for later use or processing, for
example the generation of customer billing. The historian is
an integral part of a SCADA or control system, and also
replies upon these database technologies. The use of SQL
systems all leave the window open for SQL injection and
other exploit of database systems to occur as well in
SCADA and control networks. Compromise and control of
the SQL elements in a system can have catastrophic effects
as was evinced in the 2003 SQL Slammer incursion into a
nuclear power plant [11] .
Even though SCADA has been flagged as a problem for at
least the past 10 years, most commercial Ethernet centric
firewalls and network security countermeasures are
focussed on the resolution of problems with TCP/IP
protocols and still largely ignore SCADA relevant protocols
[12]. This hinders the development of enterprise initiatives
as alternative products or 3rd party plugins must be adopted
often with varying levels of integration and consequent
success.
A paper by [13] highlighted a range of security issues found
in some of Australia’s critical infrastructure. These issues
can be summarised as follows.
General Issues:
x Connection of SCADA to corporate networks
x Governance
x Policy
x Physical Security
IT Specific issues:
x Un-patched hardware and software
x Lack of network segregation and segmentation
x Lack of sound authentication mechanisms
x Lack of monitoring, logging and auditing
Of concern here is that an examination of any report or
document relating to SCADA security, or recommendations
to secure SCADA lists most of the above as being areas that
must be concentrated on (Stamp et al 2003; Fink et al 2006;
Stouffer et al 2007). Furthermore, it should be noted that
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these documents have been freely available since at least
2003.

3

COUNTERMEASURES?

The typical countermeasures that are utilised for securing
Ethernet networks apply to SCADA and control networks
in theoretically the same way. These tools would include
typically include a firewall, intrusion detection systems and
some method of protocol analysis. There are however,
subtle nuances in the way these would be utilised for
instance it would be irresponsible to have an IDS halt/deny
routes in SCADA/control network.
Firewalls
Firewalls are a primary defensive mechanism for any
network situation and through stateless or stateful
inspection will allow or disallow egress of network packets
through a gateway device or control point. Support for
SCADA and control system protocols in commercial
software is improving but the take up is slow (NISCC,
2005, p.31). However, the open source community has
developed a firewall for the ModBUS protocol that runs on
Linux using extensions to the kernel netfilter firewalling
(REF modbusfw). The filtering occurs on four header
values these are:
x Function code – filtering is based on single or
multiple function codes
x UnitID – filter on specified ID
x Reference Number – filtering on a specified
reference number
x Length – Filter on size greater than, less than or equal
too.
This level of filtering allows for a reasonable degree of
protection and ability to make rulesets that for instance
would be able to trap buffer overflow attempts, incorrect or
malformed commands, out of range packets or probative
packets. This allows for a rich picture of network activity
and any associated problems to be developed using
appropriate analysis tools.
Of course modern firewalls can have custom rule sets
written and in fact some sources of these rulesets now exist
for use. These rule sets however tend to suffer from one
fatal flaw they are only as good as the person writing them
and as robust as the person(s) testing them. Furthermore as
these rule sets are often customised and run outside of the
compiled or core firewall system they can have a significant
performance impact on the firewall. Stateful packet
inspection is a necessary and useful firewall technology that
is becoming an almost default feature for TCP/IP based
firewalls. There are still few firewalls capable of decoding
SCADA protocols available, hence stateful packet
inspection at this level can be at best problematic or at
worst non-existent.
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Intrusion Detection Systems
There are commercial offerings that have limited support
for intrusion detection on SCADA and control based
protocols it should be noted that this is steadily increasing.
Commercial and open source IDS has the ability to allow
for the creation of custom rulesets. One of the supported
ones available for SCADA comes from DigitalBond group
and is designed mainly for Snort. The rulesets cover both
DNP3 and ModBUS and cover buffer overflows,
unauthorised commands and variety of other functions that
need monitoring. These rulesets although rudimentary in
nature provide a sound basis for building an IDS capability
that deals with DNP3 and ModBUS protocol traffic in an
enterprise network situation. Combined with other Snort
utilities and extensions such as Snort Wireless,
SnortReport, ACID or Base this type of system could
provide valuable sight into the SCADA networks of an
enterprise providing valuable feedback to network and
security administrators.
One of the conduits for SCADA and control systems
control are wireless systems. The use of the for instance the
Snort Wireless extensions from http://www.snortwireless.org provide some protections or at least warning
that systems are being attacked. As [14] points out, the
effectiveness of these systems in preventing attacks are
limited but some protections or at least alerts are better than
none. In the often quoted Maroochy Shire Council in
Queensland [15] case of sewerage overflow the use of a
simple wireless intrusion detection system could have
resulted in early detection of the attacks.
One method used by conventional IDS is also to deny
routes automatically based on some preset threshold in a
ruleset. This may be desirable for TCP/IP networks but is
not desirable for SCADA due to failsafes activating any
such ability in IDS should be turned off by default.
All IDS allow for the capture of packets in a network
stream to a file for later analysis. It is the authors contention
that in an enterprise network at key junctures that there
should always be a recording packet capture occurring
preferably to a hard disk. This allows for the replay of
incidents and more importantly the forensic analysis of
what actually went wrong. This is particularly relevant in
that the network borne exploit may not be a known and this
one way of at least capturing it.
Honeypot systems
It is well documented in the literature that honeypot
systems have proven their worth in being able to trap,
contain or waste resources of persons or malcode with
malicious intentions. Their purpose varies based on the
intent of the deploying entity however, the common tenet is
the emulation of a service/function within a network to
effectively deceive the attacking entity that they are in fact
attacking or probing a real system.

There is an extension for the open source honeyd honeypot
to provide emulation of PLC and SCADA technologies.
The project files are a series of enhancement and additions
to the existing honeyd architecture that enable mimicry of
ModBUS and a PLC. The level of emulation is medium
with OS fingerprints provided for a range of commonly
available PLC devices plus supporting scripts to emulate
the ModBUS protocol.
This, like the Snort IDS rulesets, provides the basis for
development of a sound, customised enterprise defensive
approach. The scripts are customisable and allow an
organisation to provide a customised and purpose designed
system. The outputs from this type of system could be used
to effectively detect inside malfeasance and also attempted
penetration of systems from outside. It should be noted that
the developers of the honeypot noted that the system would
be best deployed near a real system but at the time of
production were not aware of active and on-going attacks
on SCADA systems [16]. There have been several other
honeypot designs made for SCADA with DigitalBond [17]
being one of them.
Protocol Analysis
One of the key diagnostic tools for any network
administrator is the use of a protocol analysis tool that
allows analysis of network traffic at the packet level. The
open source tool Wireshark formerly known as Ethereal
does filtering and decodes on DNP3, ModBUS TCP. This
allows for network monitoring to occur even if the current
firewalls and other countermeasures are currently
insufficient in coverage and scope. The use of filters in
Wireshark allows for the realtime monitoring of the
enterprise network. For example monitoring could occur for
the hex string 02040506090A0F12 which is an
unauthorised write request to a PLC which could then
generate an alert or log entry. True you could use an IDS
for this but the use of Wireshark in this case is as a
diagnostic tool. As previously mentioned the use of packet
capture at key points in a network is a prudent choice.
Wireshark is one such tool that is capable or capturing
network streams to disk for later forensic investigation.

4

Conclusion

There are problems with commercial systems not fulfilling
or even supplying network countermeasures that are at least
aware of SCADA or control system protocols. Open source
solutions offer some partial remedy to the enterprise
deployment of countermeasures and monitoring for
SCADA systems.
The use of Wireshark as a defensive mechanism within
enterprise networks would currently allow for a highly
granular approach to implementation of surveillance into
SCADA based networks. This network intelligence in turn
could be used to develop or extend IDS rulesets or the
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honeypot to provide a robust and tailored solution for the
particular enterprise.
Firewalls are the primary and often only defence in a
networked environment. They are primary filters of
malcode and unauthorised transmission across a network
interface. Yet support for stateful packet inspection and
other technologies employed in conventional Ethernet
based firewalls is still very much an immature technology
in this space.
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